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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
IMPLICATION OF CIVIL LIABILITY UNDER THE NEW YORK
STOCK EXCHANGE RULES AND LISTING AGREEMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
The Securities Exchange Act of 19341 (Exchange Act) imposes a
federally supervised system of self-regulation upon the national stock ex-
changes. 2 Under this regulatory scheme, exchanges are required to promul-
gate and enforce their own rules, thereby retaining primary responsibility
for controlling and overseeing the conduct of stock exchange brokers.
3
To ensure that the Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission)
was not completely divested of its regulatory power over the exchanges,
Congress enacted sections 54 and 65 of the Exchange Act, under which
all national exchanges must register with the Commission. Under section
6(b), registration is not permitted, nor may it continue, "unless the rules
of the exchange include provisions for the expulsion, suspension, or dis-
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1970).
2. Prior to the enactment of the Exchange Act, stock exchanges were run as
private trade associations. 83 HARV. L. REV. 825-26 (1970). The current statutory
scheme, devised in 1934, was promulgated due to congressional recognition of the fact
that "[t]he great exchanges of this country upon which millions of dollars of securities
[were] sold [were] affected with a public interest in the same degree as any other
great utility." H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1934) [hereinafter cited
as 1934 HouSE REPORT]. At the time of its promulgation, the congressional scheme
of self-regulation was summarized as follows:
The Commission is empowered, if the rules of the exchange in any important matter
are not appropriate for the protection of investors or appropriate to insure fair
dealing, to order such changes in the rules after due notice and hearings as it may
deem necessary. The exchanges may alter their rules if more effective means are
discovered to meet the same or new problems. Although a wide measure of initia-
tive and responsibility is left with the exchanges, reserved control is in the Com-
mission if the exchanges do not meet their responsibility. It is hoped that the
effect of the bill will be to give to the well-managed exchanges that power neces-
sary to enable them to effect themselves needed reforms and that the occasion for
direct action by the Commission will not arise.
Id.
3. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 349-61 (1963) ; Jennings,
Self-Regulation of the Securities Industry: The Role of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 663 (1964).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78e (1970). Section 5 provides that no broker, dealer, or ex-
change may use any facility of an exchange to effect security transactions unless the
exchange is registered as a national securities exchange or is exempted from registra-
tion because of its limited volume. Id.
5. Id. § 78f (1970). Section 6 sets forth the procedures and requirements for
registration of exchanges. Id. To register, an exchange must file an agreement to
comply, and, so far as is within its powers, enforce compliance by its members with the
Exchange Act and any rule or regulation made thereunder. Id. § 78f(a) (1). The ex-
change must also file, as a prerequisite to registration, an application containing,
among other things, its constitution, rules, and an agreement to furnish the Commis-
sion with any amendments "forthwith upon their adoption." Id. § 78f(a) (2)-(4).
The Commission must register an exchange if it appears that the exchange can
comply with the statute and the Commission's rules, "and that the rules of the
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cipline of a member for conduct or proceeding inconsistent with just and
equitable principles of trade . . ." A second source of federal regulatory
control over stock exchanges - section 19 of the Exchange Act 7 - au-
thorizes the Commission to suspend an exchange "for a period not exceed-
ing twelve months" or to withdraw the registration of an exchange which
it finds has violated the Exchange Act or any rules thereunder, or "has
failed to enforce, so far as within its power, compliance therewith by a
member or by an issuer of a security registered thereon. ' 8 This con-
gressionally prescribed scheme of supervised self-regulation ensures that
national exchanges will formulate at least a general rule requiring their
members to adhere to "just and equitable principles of trade."9
In practice, however, the exchanges have promulgated many other
rules as well, primarily for the purpose of maintaining an honest and
efficient securities market.10 In addition to enacting exchange rules appli-
cable to exchange members, the exchanges require companies listing their
securities for trading (issuers) to sign a listing agreement with the ex-
change." These agreements contractually bind the issuer to adhere to
certain requirements established by exchanges for the benefit of investors.
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 12 demands that financial state-
6. Id. § 78f(b).
7. Id. § 78s.
8. Id. § 78s(a) (1). Under section 19(b), the Commission is granted the power
to change or supplement stock exchange rules when such rules are "necessary or appro-
priate for the protection of investors or to insure fair dealing in securities traded in upon
such exchange or to insure fair administration of such exchange .... " Id. § 78s(b).
In addition, under section 19(a) (3), the Commission is authorized to expel a member
or officer whom it finds has violated any provision of the Exchange Act or its rules or
has "effected any transaction for any other person who, he has reason to believe,"
is violating such provision. Id. § 78s(a) (3).
9. Id. § 78f(b). For a discussion of section 6(b), see text accompanying
note 6 supra.
10. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) rules governing solicitation of
proxies are one example of rules promulgated for this purpose. See NYSE Rules
450-60, reprinted in [1974] 2 NYSE GUIDE (CCH) 3805-15 [hereinafter cited as
NYSE GUIDE]. Other rules within this category include those dealing with: 1) over-
charges in commission rates (see NYSE CONST. art. XV, reprinted in NYSE GUIDE,
supra at 1104-13) ; 2) failure by a member firm to maintain adequate capital positions
(see NYSE Rule 325, reprinted in NYSE GUIDE, supra at 3525-49) ; and 3) a mem-
ber firm's improper supervision over its discretionary accounts (see NYSE Rule 408,
reprinted in NYSE GUIDE, supra at 3701-4 to 3701-5). See also Lowenfels, Implied
Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 COLUM. L. Rxv. 12, 25-28 (1966).
11. Section 12(a) of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful for an exchange
member or broker to effect a transaction in any nonexempt security on a national
exchange "unless a registration is effective as to such security for such exchange."
15 U.S.C. § 781(a) (1970). However, the exchange itself may still decide what
securities it will list. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY MANUAL B-3 to -4
(1972) [hereinafter cited as NYSE MANUAL]. The registration procedure is pre-
scribed in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of section 12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(b), (c), (d)
(1970), and Regulation 12B promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12b-1 to -36
(1976).
12. The NYSE is the largest stock exchange in the United States. In 1962, the
NYSE transacted eighty-six percent of the total dollar volume of all securities trans-
actions effected over registered exchanges. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMIS-
COMMENTS
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ments accompanying listing applications and those subsequently published
or sent to shareholders meet certain specified standards.' It also obligates
its listed companies to comply with certain disclosure requirements, some
of which are more demanding than those of the Exchange Act.' 4 However,
the conditions of listing go far beyond disclosure. To qualify for listing
today,
[t]he company must be a going concern or be the successor to a
going concern. While the amount of assets and earnings and the
aggregate market values are considerations, greater emphasis is placed
on such questions as the degree of national interest in the company,
the character of the market for its products, its relative stability and
position in the industry, and whether or not it is engaged in an expand-
ing industry with prospects for maintaining its position. 15
To effectuate compliance with these aforementioned guidelines, the con-
stitution of the NYSE has for years provided that its board of directors
may at any time suspend trading or strike a security from a list.'0
There is nothing in the Exchange Act which imposes civil liability
upon: 1) an exchange member for violation of an exchange rule; 2) a
SION, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 11 (1963).
13. In its listing application, the issuer must agree: 1) to publish at least annually
an independently audited balance sheet together with a surplus and income statement,
either separately for itself and every majority-held subsidiary or on a consolidated
basis; 2) to submit such financial statements at least fifteen days before the annual
meeting and not more than three months after the close of the fiscal year; and 3) to
publish quarterly statements of earnings on the basis of the same degree of consoli-
dation as in the annual report. See NYSE MANUAL, supra note 11, at A-64 to -73.
14. Compare Part I of the NYSE listing agreement, reprinted in NYSE
MANUAL, supra note 11, at A-29 to -31, with SEC Form 8-K, Rule 13a-11, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13a-ll (1975). For a columnar comparison of the Commission's registration
requirements and the NYSE's listing requirements, see [1975] 2 FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) fl l 23,095-120. On the required content of the NYSE's listing application,
see NYSE MANUAL, supra note 11, at B-33 to -78 & B-109 to -123.
15. NYSE MANUAL, supra note 11, at B-3.
16. Although there is nothing in the Exchange Act expressly limiting the ex-
changes' right to suspend trading in a security, section 19(b) (3) gives the Commis-
sion certain powers over exchange rules in respect of "the listing or striking froi
listing of any security." 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (3) (1970) (emphasis added). Addi-
tionally, SEC Rule 12d2-1 (a) provides that "a national securities exchange may sus-
pend from trading a security listed and registered thereon in accordance with its
rules." 17 C.F.R. § 240.12d2-1(a) (1976). Suspension of trading does not, how-
ever, terminate the registration of a security or immunize the issuer from the report-
ing requirements under section 13 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1970), or
the proxy rules promulgated under section 14 of the Exchange Act, id. § 78n (1970).
Trading in a security is suspended or a security is delisted when the NYSE,
acting through its board of governors, determines that continued dealings on the
NYSE are not advisable. For an enumeration of the criteria which the NYSE
examines in making a decision to delist or suspend a security from dealings, see NYSE
MANUAL, supra note 11, at A-291 to -294.1.
The Exchange Act also authorizes the Commission to suspend a security
from trading or withdraw a security's registration, subject to certain conditions set
forth in section 19(a) (2), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a) (2) (1970). Under section 12(d), id.
§ 781(d), and rule 12d2-2(f) promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12d2-2(f)
(1976), the issuer likewise has a voice in the matter.
3
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listed company for violation of its listing agreement with an exchange; or
3) an exchange for failure to discipline either members or issuers for
violation of either its rules or its listing agreement. Nevertheless, a right
of action against an exchange has been recognized since the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided the seminal case of
Baird v. Franklin'7 in 1944. A question remaining after Baird was whether
future courts would expand the Baird rationale to include an implied cause
of action against an exchange member for failure to comply with the rules of
the exchange.' Another unresolved issue concerned an even greater ex-
pansion of the theory of implied liability - whether a listed company's
violation of its listing agreement with an exchange was an actionable
offense.' 9
This Comment examines the judicial treatment of these issues in the
area of implied private actions under the NYSE rules and listing agree-
ment. After exploring the theoretical underpinnings of implied civil liability,
the Comment reviews various cases relevant to this area. Attention is
then focused upon a suggested method of determining which NYSE rules
should be actionable. Next, the Comment examines the relationship between
the disclosure requirements of the listing agreement and those embodied in
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act20 and rule lOb-52 l promulgated there-
17. 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944). In Baird, two
customers brought suit against an insolvent NYSE member, alleging that the NYSE's
failure to enforce its rules had caused their financial loss. Although the court
recognized the validity of the claim asserted, recovery was denied because plaintiffs
failed to prove causation. Id. at 244-46.
18. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 817 (1966), was the first case to address this issue directly. In Colonial,
plaintiff-investor alleged that he had suffered damages due to the failure of his broker-
dealer to adhere to "just and equitable principles of trade" within the meaning of
section 6(b) of the Exchange Act. Id. at 179-80. For a discussion of section 6(b),
see text accompanying note 6 supra. Although the Second Circuit held that the com-
plaint did not assert a valid federal claim, it did not foreclose the possibility that other
NYSE rules might provide the basis for implying private rights of action. 358 F.2d
at 182-83.
19. The Second Circuit has recently held that allegations that an issuer has
violated his listing agreement with the NYSE and section A10 of the NYSE MANUAL
are sufficient to confer federal jurisdiction under the Exchange Act. See Van Gemert
v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373, 1382 (1975) ; notes 83-93 and accompanying text infra.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1970).
21. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976). This rule, promulgated by the Commission in
1942, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interestate [sic] commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976).
COMMENTS
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under. Finally, consideration is given to the impact which these judicially
implied liabilities will have upon the scheme of supervised self-regulation
mandated by the Exchange Act.
II. RATIONALES FOR IMPLYING PRIVATE ACTIONS UNDER
THE EXCHANGE ACT
The implied cause of action - i.e., the "extension of a civil remedy
to one injured by another's breach of a statute or regulation not providing
for such relief" 22 - is a prominent judicial doctrine. Although the courts
have developed at least four rationales to justify implying private rights,
the statutory tort theory, which authorizes an implied cause of action to
preserve the rights of those whose interests the statute was designed to
protect, appears to be the rationale most often applied. 23 In Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co.,24 the first case to recognize the existence of a
private cause of action for damages under rule lOb-5, the court employed
the statutory tort theory in holding that in view of the general purpose of
the Exchange Act to regulate all kinds of securities transactions, "the mere
omission of an express provision for civil liability is not sufficient to nega-
tive what the general [tort] law implies.
'25
A second basis for implying civil liability, statutory voidability, 20
treats the plaintiff-investor as either a party to an implied contract with
22. 77 HARV. L. REV. 285, 285 (1963). A number of implied liabilities have been
judicially imposed under the Exchange Act, particularly under section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder (see notes 20 & 21 supra) and under section 14(a),
15 U.S.C. § 78(n) (a) (1970).
23. See 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD - SEC Rule 10b-5, at § 2.4
(1) (a) (1975).
24. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
25. Id. at 514. The court cited section 286 of the Restatement of Torts, which
states:
§ 286. VIOLATIONS CREATING CIVIL LIABILITY.
The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or by fail-
ing to do a required act, makes the actor liable for an invasion of an interest
of another if:
(a) the intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an interest
of the other as an individual; and,
(b) the interest invaded is one which the enactment is intended to protect; and,
(c) where the enactment is intended to protect an interest from a particular
hazard, the invasion of the interests results from that hazard; and,
(d) the violation is a legal cause of the invasion, and the other has not so
conducted himself as to disable himself from maintaining an action.
Id. at 513 (emphasis added). This section has since been rewritten to provide that
the court "may adopt" the standard of behavior contained in a statute as the standard
of care in civil suits. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965) (emphasis
added). In noting that the language of the Second Restatement seems to provide a
weaker basis for the implication of private rights, one commentator remarked that
"the liability theory is so firmly ensconsed in lOb-5 jurisprudence that the later
Restatement is unlikely to have any effect on it." See A. BROMBERG, supra note 23,
at § 2.4(1) (a) n.57.
26. See A. BROMBERG, supra note 23, at § 2.4(1) (b).
[VOL. 22
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his broker-dealer 27 or a third party beneficiary of the contract between
the exchange and its members or listed companies. 2  The source of this
27. It is well established that a customer who effects a securities transaction
through a broker must bear any losses caused by the customs and rules of the market.
See Bibb v. Allen, 149 U.S. 481, 489-90 (1893); Lynch v. Maw, 3 Utah 2d 271, 273,
282 P.2d 841, 843 (1955) ; 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1812 n.427 (2d ed. 19o1).
The statutory voidability theory imputes to the broker a contractual agreement likewise
to be bound by these "marketplace" rules. The constitution of the NYSE seems to
buttress this aproach by providing that NYSE rules will automatically be incor-
porated into any contracts between N YSE members unless they expressly agree other-
wise. See NYSE CONST. art. XII, § 2, reprinted in NYSE GUIDE, supra note 10,
at 1090.
28. Third party beneficiary liability requires an intention on the part of the
contracting parties, especially the promisee-exchange, to confer a beneht upon the
customer. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 133(1) (b) (1973). see also
4 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 776 (1951 & Supp. 1971). Because the exchange must intend
to benefit the investor, this form of liability would seem to be limited to rules with
substantive content designed for the public benefit. For a discussion of the various
categories of exchange rules, see notes 94-102 and accompanying text infra. The
damages recoverable in these third party beneficiary actions would be determined by
the actual amount of harm foreseeable at the time the contract was made. See Hadley
v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854). Additionally, plaintiff would have to
prove the amount of his damages with reasonable certainty. See RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS § 331(1) (1932).
The major deficiency of this theory of implied liability is that an injured
investor cannot always fit into the classification of "intended beneficiary," which is
defined by Professor Corbin as follows:
A third party who is not a promisee and who gave no consideration has an en-
forceable right by reason of a contract made by two others (1) if he is a creditor
of the promisee or of some other person and the contract calls for a performance
by the promisor in satisfaction of the obligation; or (2) if the promised perform-
ance will be of pecuniary benefit to him and the contract is so expressed as to
give the promisor reason to know that such benefit is contemplated by the promisee
as one of the motivating causes of his making the contract.
A. CORBIN, supra at § 776. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 133(2)
(1973).
While a stockholder may be considered a third party beneficiary of a corpora-
tion's listing agreement with the NYSE, one court has refused to extend the status
of "intended beneficiary" to a prospective purchaser of stock. See MacKubin v.
Curtiss-Wright Corp., 190 Md. 52, 57 A.2d 318 (1948) (prospective purchaser
denied standing to sue as third party beneficiary to recover damages alleged to have
resulted from breach of listed company's agreement with NYSE to publish promptly
its decision to pass a dividend). Professor Corbin, discussing MacKubin, remarked
that "[it would have been helpful if the court had analyzed the purposes for which
the exchange exacted the promise as a condition of listing." A. CORBIN, supra at § 779D.
In Gaynor v. Buckley, 318 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1963), the court held that
failure of a listed company to comply with the NYSE's requirement of shareholder
approval for authorization of options was not an actionable offense when state law
did not likewise require such approval. Id. at 435. However, in the recent case of
Weinberger v. NYSE, 335 F. Supp. 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), the court upheld an action
for damages against the NYSE based upon the theory that the plaintiff-investor was
a third party beneficiary to a contract (registration agreement filed pursuant to section
6(a) (1) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (3) (1970)) between the NYSE
and the Commission. In analyzing whether Congress had intended that the NYSE
be held liable to individual investors for failing to enforce its rules, the Weinberger
court examined the congressional intent as interpreted by the court in Baird v. Franklin
(see notes 36-43 and accompanying text infra) and concluded that Congress had
intended to provide such a remedy. 335 F. Supp. at 144. The court reasoned that
this interpretation made the investor "more than an incidental beneficiary of the
COMMENTS
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implied right is section 29(b) of the Exchange Act,29 which voids every
contract made in violation of the Act or any rule thereunder.
In J.1. Case Cd. v. Borak,30 the United States Supreme Court sug-
gested a third rationale for implying causes of action under the Exchange
Act. This theory, which can be referred to as statutory implication,31
suggests that the need for a remedy to effectuate the purposes of the
Exchange Act will suffice to justify the implication of a private action .
2
contract mandated by an Act of Congress," and, therefore, gave him an independent
claim for relief. Id. at 144. For a further discussion of the third party beneficiary
concept, see notes 92 & 93 and accompanying text infra.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1970). Section 29(b) is applicable only if there is
privity of contract, "or perhaps when the plaintiff can work out a third-party bene-
ficiary relationship." Id. See'L. Loss, supra note 27, at 1759. The Kardon court, in
applying this second theory of implication, stated:
[A] statutory enactment that a contract of a certain kind shall be void almost
necessarily implies a remedy in respect of it. The statute [section 29(b)] would
be of little value unless a party to the contract could apply to the Courts to relieve
himself of obligations under it or to escape its consequences.
69 F. Supp. at 514.
30. 377 U.S. 426 (1964). This case, brought under section 14(a) of the Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970), provided the Supreme Court with its first oppor-
tunity to consider implied private rights of action for violations of any of the federal
securities statutes. The plaintiff-stockholder in this derivative suit asserted that the
corporation had deprived him of his preemptive rights by participating in a consum-
mated merger authorized through the use of false and misleading proxy statements,
allegedly in violation of section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, id. § 78n(a). 377 U.S.
at 427. Plaintiff based his assertion of federal jurisdiction upon section 27 of the
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970). 377 U.S. at 429.
Section 14(a) makes it unlawful "for any person . .. in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe ...for the protection
of investors, to solicit .. .any proxy .... ." 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970). Section 27
grants the federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over "all suits in equity and
actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter [Exchange
Act] or the rules and regulations thereunder." Id. § 78aa.
31. See A. BROMBERG, supra note 23, at § 2.4(1) (c).
32. The Borak Court, sustaining plaintiff's federal cause of action, pointed to
the broad remedial purposes of section 14(a) :
The purpose of § 14(a) is to prevent management or others from obtaining
authorization for corporate action by means of deceptive or inadequate disclosure
in proxy solicitation .... It was intended to "control the conditions under which
proxies may be solicited with a view to preventing the recurrence of abuses
which .. . [had] frustrated the free exercise of the voting rights of stockholders."
377 U.S. at 431, quoting 1934 HoUsE REPORT, supra note 2, at 14. The Court then
noted that although the language of section 14(a) made no specific reference to private
actions, "among its chief purposes [was] 'the protection of investors,' which certainly
implie[d] the availability of judicial relief where necessary to achieve that result."
377 U.S. at 432 (emphasis added), quoting S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12
(1934). In conclusion, the Court quoted its own decision in Deckert v. Independence
Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940):
"The power to enforce [granted to the district courts by § 27] implies the power
to make effective the right of recovery afforded by the Act. And the power to
make the right of recovery effective implies the power to utilize any of the pro-
cedures or actions normally available to the litigant according to the exigencies
of the particular case."
377 U.S. at 433-34, quoting Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. at 288
(emphasis supplied by the Court).
[VOL. 22
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Statutory policy,33 the final basis for implying private actions, encom-
passes the three previously discussed theories and seeks to ensure enforce-
ment of the statutory policy of providing "complete and effective sanctions,
public and private, with respect to the duties and obligations imposed
under" the Exchange Act.34 Support for this theory can be found in section
2 of the Exchange Act.
35
III. CASE LAW
A. Actions Against the Exchange
Baird v. Franklin,36 decided by the Second Circuit in 1944, was the
first instance of judicial recognition that a registered exchange could be
held civilly liable for failure to enforce its own rules. The majority of the
Baird court "accede[d] to the view" that the exchange had breached a
duty when it failed to enforce its rules.3 7 However, finding the requisite
causation absent, it affirmed the lower court's dismissal of plaintiffs' com-
plaints. 38 Judge Clark, dissenting on the causation holding, 39 interpreted
section 6(b) of the Exchange Act as requiring the exchanges not only to
enact rules designed to promote just and equitable principles of trade, but to
enforce them as well.40 After acknowledging that one purpose of the Ex-
change Act was investor protection, he addressed the issue of implied rights:
Section 2 [of the Exchange Act] also states that another goal of the
statute is to make the control of securities transactions "reasonably
complete and effective." If these aims are to be followed by the Act,
then, if the investing public is to be completely and effectively pro-
tected, § 6(b) must be construed as granting to injured investors
individual causes of action to enforce the statutory duties imposed
upon the exchanges.
41
33. See A. BROMBERG, supra note 23, at § 2.4(1) (d).
34. Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961) (action by defrauded pur-
chaser of corporate stock for damages and other relief).
35. Section 2 states that "transactions in securities as commonly conducted upon
securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets are affected with a national public
interest which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control of such trans-
actions .... " 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1970). Another goal of the statute which is enunciated
in this section is to make the control of securities transactions "reasonably complete
and effective." Id.
36. 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944). For a summary of
the court's holding, see note 17 and accompanying text supra.
37. Id. at 239.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 240 (Clark, J., dissenting in part).
40. Id. at 244. Judge Clark asserted that "[a]ny other construction would render
the provision meaningless." Id. For a discussion of section 6(b), see text accom-
panying note 6 supra.
41. 141 F.2d at 244-45, quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1970). Judge Clark seemed to
adopt the statutory tort theory of implication:
The fact that the statute provides no machinery or procedure by which the
individual right of action can proceed is immaterial. It is well established that
members of a class for whose protection a statutory duty is created may sue for
COMMENTS
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The scope of the implied cause of action recognized in Baird is quite
narrow: first, the NYSE's duty to investigate and discipline members does
not arise until the NYSE has reason to believe that the member has vio-
lated its rules ;42 second, the NYSE's failure to fulfill this duty does not
become an actionable offense unless this course of conduct would serve to
prevent the plaintiff's loss.
43
The rule of Baird was extended to negligent violations of section 6
in Pettit v. American Stock Exchange,44 a case decided nineteen years
after Judge Clark's articulation of the theory of implied exchange liability.
The 1967 decision of Butterman v. Walston & Co.45 marked a retreat
from the Pettit court's holding that exchanges were liable for negligent
failure to enforce their rules.40 The Seventh Circuit concluded in Butter-
man that the NYSE
had no duty to supervise or review . . . [the member's or broker's]
activities, nor any liability because of violation of its rules where it
had no knowledge, or reasonable way of gaining knowledge, of alleged
violations, and no duty to enforce its rules against violators until it
had, or should have had, knowledge of violation or suspected vio-
lation.
47
B. Actions Against Exchange Members
The first case to consider the question of whether exchange members
could be held civilly liable for violating exchange rules was the Second
Circuit's 1966 decision in Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co.4 8 While
injuries resulting from its breach and that the common law will supply a
remedy if the statute gives none.
141 F.2d at 245 (citations omitted); see note 23 and accompanying text supra.
42. 141 F.2d at 239.
43. Id.
44. 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). In Pettit, the trustee in bankruptcy of a
company with shares listed on the American Stock Exchange brought suit against
that exchange, alleging that defendant's failure to carry out its obligations under
section 6 of the Exchange Act permitted the perpetration of a scheme to defraud the
listed company. Id. at 29. For a discussion of section 6(b), see text accompanying
note 6 supra.
45. 387 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1967). In Butterman,
stock purchasers brought suit against their stockbroker, the NYSE, and the NYSE's
president, seeking to recover for money losses allegedly caused by the NYSE's failure
to enforce its rules. 387 F.2d at 823. The complaint charged that the NYSE was
negligent in failing to supervise its members as required by the NYSE rules and
constitution, thereby enabling the defendant stockbroker to "falsely hold herself out as
a duly registered seller of securities." Id. at 824. The court held that plaintiffs had
failed to meet their burden of disclosing a genuine issue of material fact. Id.
46. See Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. at 29-30.
47. 387 F.2d at 825 (emphasis added).
48. 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966). This controversy
arose when defendant-broker sold securities from Colonial's margin account, allegedly
in violation of an oral agreement between the parties that no such sale would be
effected unless the margin account fell below the minimum amount required by the
NYSE. Id. at 179. Colonial's complaint predicated jurisdiction upon an implied right
of action under the Exchange Act, asserting that Bache's alleged conduct was "incon-
sistent with just and equitable principles of trade" within the meaning of section 6(b)
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the Colonial court expressed approval of the holding in Baird, it pointed out
that the Baird court's implication of a cause of action against an exchange
for failure to enforce its rules did not necessarily mandate a similar right
of action against a member who had violated. them.49 In discussing whether
civil liability could be imposed for violation of stock exchange rules, the
Colonial court observed that different rules had been adopted for different
reasons and thus bore different relationships to the Exchange Act and the
Commission's regulations thereunder.50 Examining NYSE Rule 401,
promulgated under section 6(b) of the Exchange Act, the Colonial court
remarked that this rule "could hardly be broader." 51 The court also noted
that section 6(b) seemed to anticipate that investors would be protected
solely through the exchanges' enforcement of their own rules; therefore, it
was highly unlikely that Congress had intended for rule violations to give
rise additionally to civil claims brought by private investors.5 2 In con-
(see text accompanying note 6 supra) and the rules and constitution of the NYSE.
Id. at 179-80. Specifically, plaintiff contended that Bache had violated article XIV,
section 6 of the NYSE Constitution and NYSE Rule 401. Article XIV, section 6,
provides:
A member, allied member, member firm, member corporation or director of
a member corporation who or which shall be adjudged guilty, in a proceeding
under this Article of a violation of the Constitution of the Exchange or of a
violation of a rule adopted pursuant to the Constitution or of a violation of a
resolution of the Board of Directors regulating the conduct or business of mem-
bers, allied members, member firms or member corporations or of conduct or
proceeding inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade may, if a mem-
ber, allied member, member firm or member corporation, be suspended or ex-
pelled or, if an approved person, have his approval withdrawn.
NYSE CONST. art. XIV, § 6, reprinted in NYSE GUIDE, supra note 10, at 1095.
NYSE Rule 401 states: "Every member, allied member and member organization
shall at all times adhere to the principles of good business practice in the conduct of
his or its business." NYSE GUIDE, supra note 10, at 3695. For a further discussion
of the Colonial court's holding, see note 18 supra.
49. 358 F.2d at 181.
50. Id.
51. Id. For the text of rule 401, see note 48 supra.
52. 358 F.2d at 181. The court felt that another factor tending to negate an
implied right under section 6(b) was the absence of any reference to NYSE rules in
section 27 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970) (the jurisdictional pro-
vision), since exchange rules were specifically mentioned in other sections of the
Exchange Act, such as section 2 9(a), id. § 78cc(a) (1970). 358 F.2d at 181-82.
One commentator was quite critical of the Colonial court's analysis of these two
Exchange Act sections:
The use of section 29(a) - with its inclusion in the non-waiver stipulation of
exchange rules required by the Exchange Act, which clearly includes the section
6(b) rule - to aid in a negative conclusion on implied rights is proper in the
sense that the wording of section 29(a) and of other sections proves the point
about the reference to "rules" in section 27; but section 29(a) itself is, because
of the non-waiver language, the best technical argument for creation of implied
rights for violations of the section 6(b) rule.
Shipman, Two Current Questions Concerning Implied Private Rights of Action Under
the Exchange Act: Authority of the Administrative Agency to Negate; Existence for
Violation of Self-Regulatory Requirements, 17 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 925, 999 (1966).
For a discussion of the statutory voidability theory under section 29, see notes 26-29
and accompanying text supra.
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clusion, the court enunciated its landmark test for determining when a
violation of an exchange rule should be actionable in a suit brought by an
injured investor:
[W]e cannot ignore that the concept of supervised self-regulation is
broad enough to encompass a rule which provides what amounts to a
substitute for regulation by the SEC itself ....
What emerges is that whether the courts are to imply federal
civil liability for violation of exchange or dealer association rules by
a member cannot be determined on the simplistic all-or-nothing basis
urged by the two parties; rather, the court must look to the nature
of the particular rule and its place in the regulatory scheme, with
the party urging the implication of a federal liability carrying a con-
siderably heavier burden of persuasion than when the violation is of
the statute or an SEC regulation. The case for implication would be
strongest when the rule imposes an explicit duty unknown to the
common law.
53
Three years after the Second Circuit articulated the "substitution
test"5 4 for determining which NYSE rules should provide a basis for
private suits against NYSE members, the Seventh Circuit, in Buttrey v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,55 enunciated an alternative
to the Colonial rationale. The court, upholding plaintiff's cause of action,
held that jurisdiction could properly be based upon section 27 of the
Exchange Act.5" It then espoused the following test for determining when
a violation of a NYSE rule is actionable: "[T] he touchstone for determin-
ing whether or not the violation of a particular rule is actionable should
properly depend upon its design 'for the direct protection of investors.' -57
53. 358 F.2d at 182 (emphasis added). The court found that the rules in issue in
Colonial did not satisfy this test since they were very broad and vague and it was
unlikely that Congress had meant them to impose a new legal standard upon exchange
members. Id. The court also stated that a contrary holding would have a disruptive
effect upon the securities markets. Id. at 182-84.
54. See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
55. 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969). In Buttrey, a
trustee in bankruptcy alleged that defendant Merrill Lynch had violated NYSE Rule
405, the "Know Your Customer Rule," with respect to its dealings with the bankrupt.
410 F.2d at 137; see NYSE Rule 405, reprinted in NYSE GUIDE, supra note 10, at 3697.
56. The court cited the jurisdictional provision of the Exchange Act, section 27,
15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970), and held that there was
nothing inconsistent with th[at] Section in holding that violations of Rule 405
m[ight] be actionable as a "duty created by this chapter" [Exchange Act] inas-
much as Rule 405 was promulgated in accordance with Sections 6 and 19 of the
Act, even if Rule 405 [was] not . . . itself . . . considered a rule "thereunder."
410 F.2d at 142. For a discussion of alternative jurisdictional bases for implied actions
under federal law, see Wolfson & Russo, The Stock Exchange Member: Liability
for Violation of Stock Exchange Rules, 58 CALIF. L. REv. 1120, 1127-29 (1970);
Note, Private Actions as a Remedy for Violations of Stock Exchange Rules, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 825, 832-34 (1970).
57. 410 F.2d at 142, citing Lowenfels, supra note 10, at 29. Lowenfels suggests
that the courts adopt the following method of determining when to allow private
parties to recover for damages sustained as a result of rule violations:
Rather than the present case law's mechanical distinction between actions
brought against an exchange and actions brought against private parties, a more
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The court cited with approval the district court's determination that rule
405 served both an actionable public protection function and a nonaction-
able "housekeeping" function.," Due to this dual aspect of the rule, the
court held that its alleged violation was not per se actionable but instead
required a case-by-case scrutiny of available proof to determine whether
the offense was one which would give rise to civil liability under section 6
of the Exchange Act.59
In Wells v. Blythe & Co.,60 the next case in this line of decisions,
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California
held that an allegation of defendant's negligent violation of a rule of the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) was insufficient to
state a federal cause of action.61 The court, however, seemed to indicate
that an allegation of fraudulent or manipulative conduct would provide the
basis for implied civil liability predicated upon the violation of the "suit-
ability" rule of the NASD.6 2 Other cases following Colonial and Buttrey
have likewise made an allegation of fraud the touchstone of civil liability.
6 3
fruitful approach might be to determine whether the reasons behind a particular
exchange rule justify its use as a basis for imposing liability either upon the
exchange or a private party. Simply stated, exchange rules which are promul-
gated for the direct protection of the investing public should give rise to private
actions against an exchange and other private parties, while rules promulgated
merely as "housekeeping" devices to guide the membership should not.
Lowenfels, supra note 10, at 24-25.
58. 410 F.2d at 141.
59. Id. at 142-43. In adopting the "public benefit" theory suggested by Lowenfels,
the Buttrey court departed sharply from the Colonial court's holding that a rule is
actionable only if it is a substitute for a federal statute. See note 53 and accompanying
text supra. One possible explanation for the result in Buttrey is that the court ex-
pressly mentioned that the allegations there were "tantamount to fraud on the bank-
rupt's customers, thus giving rise to a private civil damage action." 410 F.2d at 143.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine with exactitude the actual effect which
this allegation of defendant's actual fraud had upon the Buttrey court's final resolu-
tion of the case.
60. 351 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Wells involved an action by customers
of a broker of defendant Blythe & Co. for damages resulting from the broker's failure
to execute a sell order on a specific date. Id. at 999. The plaintiffs' alleged loss was
caused by a subsequent decline in the value of the stock in question. Id.
61. Id. at 1001-02.
62. Id. at 1002. The NASD "suitability rule" is the equivalent of NYSE Rule 405
(see note 55 supra). See NASD CONST. art. III, § 2, reprinted in [1975] 3 FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 1125,592.
63. See, e.g., SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 880 (1972) (brokerage firm held liable to its customers for damages incurred
due to failure to inspect and review the correspondence of its president, who had
fraudulently induced customers to transfer money to him) ; Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 11 92,748, at 99,272 (N.D. Ill., Apr. 7, 1970) (court applied Buttrey rationale
and refused to allow recovery for violation of NYSE Rule 405 absent a showing of
fraud); Mercury Inv. Co. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 295 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D. Tex.
1969) (court stated that it would require a rule violation equivalent to fraud to allow
recovery under NASD suitability rule); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F.
Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970)
(court noted that Exchange Act was directed against fraud, not against negligence,
but refrained from disposing of the case upon this basis because of its holding that
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This approach, permitting only those rules which mirror the fraud pro-
visions of the federal securities laws to be actionable, will doubtless under-
mine the rationales of both the "substitution" and the "public benefit" tests.
Starkman v. Seroussi, decided by the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York,6 4 illustrates yet another consequence
of the judicial implication of civil liability under stock exchange rules. The
issue presented in Starkman was whether a violation of the NYSE rules
conferred a private right of action under the Exchange Act so as to vest
exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts under section 27 of the Act,"'
thereby allowing the customer to prosecute his suit in federal court instead
of compelling him to submit his claim to arbitration."0 After holding that
rule violations were "such an integral part of the transaction as to con-
stitute a sufficient claim for violation of sections 6 and 19 of the Exchange
Act," 17 the court ruled that the customer was entitled to be heard in
federal court and "[could] not be compelled to submit his claim to
arbitration. " 08
plaintiff was estopped by her own actions from proving a violation of the NASD
suitability rule).
64. 377 F. Supp. 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). In Starkman, a customer brought an
action against his broker for alleged violations of the NYSE rules prohibiting repre.
sentatives from participating in transactions with customers. Id. at 520.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
66. 377 F. Supp. at 524. This issue arose when the broker attempted to enforce
an arbitration provision in an agreement signed by plaintiff at the time he opened his
securities account. Id. at 521. When plaintiff refused to arbitrate, the broker defended
in federal court by asserting that plaintiff's claim did not involve a violation of the
Exchange Act and was therefore clearly within the arbitration clause which plaintiff
had signed. Id. at 520-21.
67. Id. at 524.
68. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied heavily upon the United
States Supreme Court decision of Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). In that
action, brought by a customer against a brokerage firm under section 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970), the Court held that a customer's
agreement to arbitrate future controversies was void under section 14 of that Act.
346 U.S. at 434-35. Section 14 provides that: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision
binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of
this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void." 15
U.S.C. § 77n (1970).
The Wilko Court ruled that a customer's agreement to arbitrate is a "stipu-
lation" and that "the right to select the judicial forum is the kind of 'provision' that
cannot be waived under § 14 of the Securities Act." 346 U.S. at 435. The corollary
to this holding is that a broker would likewise be entitled to stay arbitration whenever
he preferred to have the suit heard in federal court. One commentator has suggested
that in many instances it would behoove a broker to take this action. For example:
In a relatively small claim a plaintiff would be required to engage his own counsel,
which he need not do in arbitration. Consequently, final judgment would be
delayed for several years, probably at great expense to the plaintiff. A large
broker is well equipped to handle small litigation with an in-house staff, and
could delay a speedy resolution of the claim at a minimal cost to itself.
Hoblin, A Stock Broker's Implied Liability to Its Customer for Violation of a Rule
of a Registered Stock Exchange, 39 FORDHAm L. REv. 253, 269 (1970). The same
author further hypothesized that a broker would prefer arbitration when he was
right and the courts when he was wrong, primarily because it is much easier to con-
fuse a jury with the technicalities of the trade than it is to confuse an arbitrator who
is quite familiar with the securities business. Id.
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C. Actions Against Listed Companies
Another potential defendant in an implied private rights action is an
issuer whose securities are listed on a national stock exchange. 69 The
liability of the issuer must be predicated upon its listing agreement with
the exchange and not upon the stock exchange rules, as is the case with
the liability of exchange members. 70 Unfortunately, the courts (as well as
litigants) have not always clearly distinguished between these two distinct
causes of action.71 Illustrative of this lack of differentiation is the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York's analysis of
the controversy presented in Kroese v. New York Stock Exchange,72 a
1964 action brought against a company whose trust certificates were listed
on the NYSE. The plaintiff in Kroese based his action upon alleged
violations of both NYSE Rule 49973 and the "supplementary material
74
which followed the rule in the NYSE Guide,75 the publication containing
rules and policies applicable to NYSE members. Specifically, plaintiff
alleged that the company had failed to hold regular meetings of its certifi-
cate holders. 76 The court dismissed the action, finding no requirement in
the rules of the NYSE that issuers hold regular meetings ;77 at no point
in the opinion did the court take note of the fact that it was the supple-
mentary material, in reality a part of the NYSE Manual78 containing the
69. For an enumeration of the requirements imposed upon issuers when they list
their securities on a national stock exchange, see notes 11-16 and accompanying
text supra.
70. One commentator has suggested that the same liabilities which arise out of a
breach of the listing agreement should also arise for breach of obligations imposed
by the NYSE Manual. See Shipman, supra note 52, at 1009 n.420. See also note 78
infra. This appears to be a sound approach and is the one adopted by the Second
Circuit in Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373 (2d Cir. 1975). For a discussion
of Van Gernert, see notes 83-93 and accompanying text infra.
71. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964); Kroese v. New
York Stock Exch., 227 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). For a discussion of the O'Neill
and Kroese cases, see notes 72-82 and accompanying text infra.
72. 227 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). The plaintiff in Kroese alleged that the
defendant had failed to comply with a rule of the NYSE which plaintiff interpreted
as requiring listed companies to hold regular meetings of owners. Id. at 519, 521.
73. Rule 499 states that "[s]ecurities admitted to the list may be suspended from
dealings or removed from the list at any time." NYSE Rule 499, reprinted in NYSE
GUIDE, supra note 10, at 4235-39. It seems clear that the rule itself imposes no duties
upon the listed companies.
74. 277 F. Supp. at 520. This "supplementary material" is merely an excerpt
from the NYSE Manual. See NYSE MANUAL, supra note 11, at A-291 to -294;
note 78 infra.
75. The NYSE GUIDE is "the official publication of the Directory, Constitution,
Rules and Policies of the Exchange. . . . Its central purpose is to provide Members,
Allied Members and Registered Representatives of the Exchange with complete, up-
to-date information concerning the various facets of their business as brokers and
dealers." NYSE GUIDE, supra note 10, at 101 (emphasis added).
76. 227 F. Supp. at 519.
77. Id. at 521.
78. The introduction to the NYSE Manual provides:
This Manual is an attempt to present, in ready reference form, methods and
procedures for publicizing corporate actions for the benefit of holders of securities,
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NYSE's policies and requirements with respect to listed companies, which
imposed these requirements upon the issuer. It is thus evident from its
treatment of the case that the Kroese court failed to recognize that an
action against an issuer must be based upon the listing agreement and
the materials included in the NYSE Manual and not upon the rules of
the NYSE.
79
O'Neill v. Maytag,80 decided by the Second Circuit in 1964, was the
next case to deal with the implied liability of a listed company. In denying
plaintiff's request to amend his complaint to include an allegation of a
NYSE rule violation, 8' the court remarked:
Whether or not such a violation might give rise to a cause of action
against the defendants under state law, we do not think that it does
so under federal law. The Exchange itself is under a federal duty to
enforce its rules, and this duty may be enforceable in a private suit.
It does not follow, however, that a suit against a listed company or its
officers based on violation of an Exchange rule arises under federal
law, and we see no reason for so holding.
2
Van Gemert v. Boeing Co.,s3 decided by the Second Circuit in July
1975, was the first decision to both recognize and discuss the possibility
of implied liability for violation of the NYSE Listing Agreement and
portions of the NYSE Manual. The complaint in that class action, brought
by nonconverting holders of the Boeing Company's convertible debentures,
alleged that Boeing's failure to give them adequate and reasonable notice
of its intention to redeem its securities was responsible for their failure
and the relationships of those actions to the proper conduct of a securities market
place. It includes a codification of the policies, requirements, procedures and prac-
tices of the Exchange relating to listed companies and their securities ....
NYSE MANUAL, supra note 11, at iii (emphasis added).
79. See note 70 and acompanying text supra. See also notes 75 & 78 supra.
80. 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964). Plaintiff brought a shareholder's derivative
action, alleging that management had induced his company to purchase a large block
of stock at a premium solely to protect its own control position. Id. at 766-67. After
the court held that the complaint did not state a cause of action under section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1970), rule lob-5 promulgated thereunder,
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976), or section 409(b) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49
U.S.C. § 1379(b) (1970), plaintiff moved to amend his complaint to set forth a cause
of action under the NYSE rules. Id. at 770.
81. Id. at 770. Like the plaintiff in Kroese (see notes 71-79 and accompanying
text supra), the plaintiff in O'Neill failed to distinguish between a cause of action
based upon a NYSE rule (not applicable to a listed company) and a cause of action
based upon the NYSE Listing Agreement and the supplementary materials found in
the NYSE Manual. The O'Neill court unfortunately made the same mistake. See
text accompanying note 82 infra.
82. 339 F.2d at 770 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Judge Friendly,
writing for the court in Colonial (see notes 48-53 and accompanying text supra),
remarked that the O'Neill court had repudiated "a belated attempt to rest federal
jurisdiction on a listing agreement between a corporation and the NYSE." Colonial
Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
817 (1966).
83. 520 F.2d 1373 (2d Cir. 1975).
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to exercise their conversion rights.8 4 Plaintiffs' first contention was that
Boeing was civilly liable under federal law for violating both the NYSE
listing agreement 5 and section A10 of the NYSE Manual, 6 since these
NYSE requirements were
an extension of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and an integral
part of the statutory scheme under which exchanges [were] required
to adopt rules, 15 U.S.C. § 78f, which [could] be ordered by the
Commission to be altered, 15 U.S.C. § 7 8s, and the violation of which
[could] give rise to a civil action under federal law.
8 7
Terming this claim a "colorable" one, the court reasoned that the listing
agreement and NYSE Manual were "instruments corresponding" to NYSE
rules within the coverage of section 6(a) (3) of the Exchange Act.88
84. Id. at 1374-75. Plaintiffs alleged damages based upon the fact that their
debentures were worth less per $100 of principal amount when redeemed after the
call deadline than they would have been worth at the cutoff date for the exercise of
their conversion privileges. Id. at 1374.
85. The listing agreement between Boeing and the NYSE, dated November 5,
1957, provided in pertinent part:
The Corporation will publish immediately to the holders of any of its securities
listed on the Exchange any action taken by the Corporation with respect to
dividends or to the allotment of rights to subscribe or to any rights or benefits
Pertaining to the ownership of its securities listed on the Exchange; and will give
prompt notice to the Exchange of any such action; and will afford the holders
of its securities listed on the Exchange a proper period within which to record
their interests and to exercise their rights ...
Id. at 1376 (emphasis supplied by the court); see NYSE MANUAL, supra note 11,
at A-34.
86. See NYSE MANUAL, supra note 11, at A-170 to -180. This section deals
with redemption of listed securities and details the publicity and notice to the NYSE
which are required when a listed company takes this action. The defendant in Van
Gemert, in response to plaintiffs' demand for admission, admitted that it had not
issued a general publicity release in connection with the redemption of debentures, as
required by section A10 of the NYSE Manual, until March 25, 1966 - four days
before the expiration of the conversion privilege on March 29, 1966. 520 F.2d at 1377-78.
Since the Boeing board of directors had authorized the call on February 28, 1966,
and had firmed up key dates for redemption and expiration of the conversion rights
shortly thereafter, 526 F.2d at 1377, the delay in releasing this information to the
public was clearly violative of the command of Section Al0, which provides: "Such
news release shall be made as soon as possible after corporate action which will lead
to, or which looks toward, redemption is taken . NYSE MANUAL, supra note 11,
at A-170.
87. 520 F.2d at 1379 (citation omitted).
88. Id. at 1380. Section 6 of the Exchange Act delineates the requirements which
an exchange must fulfill in order to be registered with the Commission. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78f (1970). In addition to a registration statement, an exchange must file with
the Commission "[c]opies of its Constitution, articles of incorporation . . . and of its
existing bylaws or rules or instruments corresponding thereto, whatever the name
.Id. § 78f(a) (3) (1970) (emphasis added).
Noting that the Second Circuit refused to imply a federal cause of action
against a listed company in O'Neill v. Maytag (see notes 80-82 and accompanying
text supra), the Van Gemert court remarked that it now felt bound to alter that
position in light of its more recent holding in Colonial (see notes 48-55 and accom-
panying text supra) and the developing case law in this area. 520 F.2d at 1380-81,
citing Starkman v. Seroussi, 377 F. Supp. 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); SEC v. First Sec.
Co., 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972). See notes 63-68
and accompanying text supra.
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The court accepted plaintiffs' position that an issuer representing to the
public that it was listed on the NYSE should be required to live up to
the standard of trustworthiness which the investing public attaches to
that status8 9 and dismissed as "equivocal" the legislative history cited by
Boeing in support of its position that Congress had not intended to extend
the ambit of the NYSE rules and regulations to issuers. 0 In conclusion,
the court rejected Boeing's additional contention that the NYSE's remedies
were limited to delisting.91
Plaintiffs' second theory of recovery was that under state law they
were third party beneficiaries of the listing agreement between Boeing
and the NYSE, as supplemented by the NYSE Manual. 2 While the
majority of the court never reached this contention, Judge Oakes, the
author of the opinion, would have upheld his claim.
93
IV. IMPLIED LIABILITY UNDER NYSE RULES: DETERMINATION
OF WHICH NYSE RULES ARE ACTIONABLE
An analysis of the judicial treatment of implied causes of action
under the NYSE rules from 1944 to the present time seems to reveal a
growing willingness on the part of the courts to hold that the violation of
at least some of these rules or some part of the listing agreements is
actionable. The question now facing the judiciary is whether these cases
should be resolved by application of the Colonial "substitution" test,
4
89. 520 F.2d at 1381. The court stated:
The public generally understands that a company must meet certain qualifications
of financial stability, prestige, and fair disclosure, in order to be accepted for that
listing, which is in turn so helpful to the sale of the company's securities.
Similarly it is held out to the investing public that by dealing in securities listed
on the New York Stock Exchange the investor will be dealt with fairly and pur-
suant to law.
Id.
This reasoning is reminiscent of the "shingle theory" associated with the case
of Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786
(1944). The theory is that a dealer, by hanging out his shingle, impliedly represents
that he will deal fairly with the public. See generally 3 L. Loss, supra note 27,
at 1482-93.
90. 520 F.2d at 1382. Boeing had pointed to the congressional debates held on a
proposed section 12(b) (1) to the Exchange Act. This proposal, although not adopted,
would have made it mandatory for listed companies to agree to comply with the
Exchange Act and the Commission's rules and regulations, and, according to the court,
"much of the debate related to whether the provision was necessary at all since such
companies would have to comply with the law regardless of any such agreement."
Id. at 1382, citing 78 CONG. RaC. 8585 (1934) (remarks of Sen. Hastings). The court
ruled that by omitting the proposed section, Congress was merely recognizing the fact
that it was unnecessary. Id. at 1382.
91. 520 F.2d at 1382.
92. Id. at 1380.
93. Id. at 1382 n.19. Judge Oakes would have held that an issuer's security
holders were creditor beneficiaries and that the corporation was therefore obligated
to treat them fairly. Id., citing RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 136 (1932). For a
further discussion of this theory of third party beneficiary liability, see note 28 supra.
94. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
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the Buttrey "public benefit"9 5 test, or some new test to be articulated in
the future. Regardless of which test is applied, the courts must first ex-
amine the purpose of the rule to determine whether a cause of action should
properly lie for its violation.96 It is submitted that a NYSE rule should be
actionable when its central purpose is to protect the interests of the in-
vesting public and where it is reasonable to assume that the Commission
had refrained from exercising its own rulemaking authority97 because it
felt that the public was being adequately protected by the regulatory scheme
established by the NYSE.9 In order to apply this test, it will be necessary
for the courts to determine in each case whether the NYSE rule in issue
is in fact a substitute for a rule of the Commission. One commentator has
suggested that this determination could be made by the Commission itself
- the Commission could issue public releases setting forth its position with
respect to future rules and could likewise clarify the status of NYSE
rules presently in effect.9 9 Another suggested test indicates that a self-
95. See notes 55-59 and accompanying text supra.
96. See Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 181 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
97. Section 11 of the Exchange Act authorizes the Commission to prescribe rules
regulating specialists' activities and floor trading by members for their own account.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78k (1970). The Commission has only issued two rules under this
section, SEC Rule lla-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1la-1 (1976) (regulation of floor trading),
and SEC Rule llb-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1lb-1 (1976) (regulation of specialists). Section
14(b) authorizes the Commission to promulgate rules governing the voting by broker-
dealers of street name securities registered on an exchange or under section 12(g),
15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1970), and the transmission of materials to the owners of such
securities. Id. § 78n(b) (1970). The Commission has not yet issued any rules under
this section.
98. This suggested test is actually a variation of the Colonial substitution rule.
Although it is important to give some consideration to whether the rule in question
was designed for the public benefit, the standard of "investor protection," standing
alone, is much too ambiguous to provide a sound basis for discriminating between
those rules which should and those which should not be actionable.
99. See Hoblin, supra note 68, at 277. This author also noted that the courts
would have an easier time determining which NYSE rules were actionable if the
NYSE were to follow his proposed guidelines in enacting its rules:
1. These rules should be divided into logical categories. As the court pointed
out in Buttrey, rule 405 contains many "housekeeping" requirements which are
not properly part of the "Know Your Customer" rule. One suspects, going a
step further, that actually some of the New York Stock Exchange rules seem
to have been used solely as a convenient depository for new ideas.
2. The purpose and history of a rule should be set forth in much the same
way as a federal statute is defined.
3. The rules should be annotated reflecting civil decisions such as Buttrey
and the Exchange's own determinations, including disciplinary proceedings which
are precedent setting.
4. The Exchange should prepare guidelines for its Department of Member
Firms and for arbitrators. In the case of the former, the guide rules should be
in the form of a "table of maximum punishments ;" for the latter, they should be
designed to assist in determining monetary liability to the public for rule violation.
5. The Exchange should carefully consider the legal impact of any rules
proposed in the future. An example would be a rule permitting the Exchange to
deny counsel to a member or employee of a member at a disciplinary proceeding.
COMMENTS
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regulatory requirement is a direct substitute for a Commission rule when:
1) a Commission rule expressly exempts persons from its requirements
because of the existence of a NYSE rule found adequate by the Com-
mission; or 2) the Commission promulgates a rule imposing requirements
similar to those imposed by a NYSE rule and limits the rule's applicability
to nonmembers or unlisted companies. 100
Irrespective of the test adopted, it is imperative that civil liability be
implied only for rules with quite explicit content; general rules merely
requiring adherence to "just and equitable principles of trade"' 0' are an
inadequate basis for implied causes of action since their ambiguity cannot
provide a court with useful guidelines for establishing the standard of care
to be met in each case. Judicial determinations that violations of these
general rules were actionable undoubtedly would lead to disruptive conse-
quences and would hardly serve to further the scheme of investor pro-
tection envisioned by the Exchange Act.
10 2
Another example would be the Exchange requiring under rule 405 that a copy of
a corporate charter be obtained for all corporate margin accounts.
6. A general counsel's office should be established at the New York Stock
Exchange, one of its responsibilities being to give official rule interpretations.
Another responsibility would be to see to it that the Exchange participates in civil
proceedings where appropriate, as outlined below.
Id. at 279 (footnote omitted).
Another issue related to the manner in which NYSE rules are currently
adopted was raised in the case of DeRenzis v. Levy, 297 F. Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
In that derivative action, the court refused to uphold a private cause of action against
a NYSE member firm for violation of a section of NYSE Rule 440, which provides
that fees for investment advisory services cannot be based upon the profits realized
from the transaction. NYSE Rule 440A.11, reprinted in NYSE GUIDE, supra note 10,
at 3781-3 to -4. The court's ruling was predicated upon its determination that the
rule in question was in conflict with both the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1970), and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80b-1 to -21 (1970). The court, in dicta, next addressed what it termed the
potentially troublesome questions as to the constituency and the procedures which
give birth to exchange rules . . . . [E]ven public officials making "legislative"
enactments of any public consequence should be bound to at least minimal standards
of notice and an opportunity for people affected to be "heard" in some rudimentary
way . . . . This is not a concern, of course, when the promulgating exchange
itself is being called upon to obey or enforce its own rules and regulations. The
problem becomes more troublesome, however, when it is proposed that such rules
should define valuable rights and costly liabilities for members of the exchange
and people dealing with them . ...
297 F. Supp. 998, 1001-02 n.5 (citations omitted).
100. See Shipman, supra note 52, at 1007. The author asserts that this approach
would have several advantages, namely, "[i]t is easy to apply, supplies the maximum
predictability, and comprehends the fewest self-regulatory requirements." Id. at
1007-08. For a critical analysis of this test, see Hoblin, supra note 68, at 277-78.
101. An example of such a rule is NYSE Rule 401, adopted by the NYSE pur-
suant to section 6(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1970). For a dis-
cussion of rule 401, see note 48 supra. For a discussion of section 6(b), see text
accompanying note 6 supra.
102. See Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182-83 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
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V. IMPLIED LIABILITY OF LISTED COMPANIES: CONFLICT BETWEEN
DISCLOSURE UNDER THE LISTING AGREEMENT AND
DISCLOSURE UNDER RULE lOb-5.
Courts have implied a private cause of action for damages under
rule l0b-5'0 3 ever since Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.' 0 4 was decided
in 1946.105 In order to prevail in an implied lOb-5 action, plaintiff must
establish the existence of several elements of proof :10 1) the purchaser-
seller standing requirement; 107 2) scienter ;108 3) reliance ;109 and 4) causa-
tion.'10 One of the policies underlying the disclosure requirements of rule
lOb-5 is making "material" information equally available to the investing
103. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976). For the text of rule 10b-5, see note 21 supra.
104. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946); see notes 24 & 25 and accompanying
text supra.
105. The Supreme Court did not consider this question until 1971. See Super-
intendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971). This action was
brought under the federal securities acts by the state superintendent of insurance,
acting as liquidator of an insurance corporation, to recover damages sustained by the
corporation when it sold almost five million dollars of United States treasury bonds
through the alleged fraud of outside collaborators, a corporate officer, and its con-
trolling shareholder. Id. at 7-9. The Court held that the corporation was the seller
of treasury bonds and was therefore protected by section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.
Id. at 9. Significantly, the Bankers Life Court also acknowledged the existence of
an implied private right of action under section 10(b). Id. at 13 n.9.
106. These elements closely resemble those required to establish the common law
tort of deceit. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 9.2 (1973).
107. Rule lOb-5 was promulgated to prevent the perpetration of fraud "in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976) (em-
phasis added). This proscription was interpreted by the Second Circuit in 1952 as
requiring that a plaintiff be an actual buyer or seller of securities in order to have
standing to sue for damages under the rule. See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,
193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). The Supreme Court re-
cently affirmed the Birnbaum rule in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723 (1975).
108. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the Supreme Court
held that scienter is a necessary element in a lob-5 action. Hochfelder involved an
action brought by customers of a brokerage firm who had invested in a fraudulent
securities scheme against the accounting firm which had audited the brokerage firm's
books to recover damages caused by the accounting firm's alleged negligence. The
Court "granted certiorari to resolve the question whether a private cause of action
for damages will lie under § 10(b) and Rule lob-5 in the absence of any allegation
of 'scienter' - intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Id. at 193 (footnote and
citations omitted). The Court concluded that it would not. Id.
109. One limitation upon the scope of lOb-5 liability is the "requirement that there
be 'reasonable' reliance upon an alleged misrepresentation and/or nondisclosure for
the fraud to be actionable." Comment, Reliance Under Rule 10b-5: Is The "Reason-
able Investor" Reasonable?, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 562, 563 (1972). For a discussion of
the criteria relied upon by the courts to measure the reasonableness of reliance, see id.
at 565-79. See also Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972)
(presumption of reliance in implied private actions brought under rule lOb-5 where
either material nondisclosure or an impersonal effect of fraud on market prices and
conditions is shown).
110. Although rule lob-5 is silent on the requirement of causation, courts have
historically required "some causal connection between one person's misconduct and
another's loss" as a prerequisite to private recovery under lOb-5. A. BROMBERG, supra
note 23, at § 8.7(1).
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public and corporate insiders."' Thus, a corporation and its insiders are
obligated to disclose to their "outside" purchasers or sellers all "material
facts" relevant to the transaction being consummated. 1 2 If the insider is
unable to make this disclosure due to his responsibility to the corporation
not to reveal prematurely certain information, 113 his only option is to
refrain from trading."
4
The NYSE likewise requires its listed companies to make "timely
and adequate disclosure" of certain "corporate news." 115 Although this
command appears to duplicate the mandate of rule 10b-5, the two rules
differ in one important respect: while to date the lOb-5 disclosure require-
ment has been invoked only when there has been actual corporate or
insider trading on the basis of inside knowledge,"16 the NYSE's requirement
is applicable even in the absence of such trading. 1 7 The NYSE additionally
obligates its issuers to give "immediate publicity and immediate notice to
the [NYSE] in respect of any corporate action . . . which will result in,
111. See 5 A. JAcoBs, THE IMPACT OF RULE lOb-5 at § 6.01 (1974).
112. See note 111 and accompanying text supra.
113. In discussing this lOb-5 duty of disclosure, Professor Loss stated that
"[c]onflict is inevitable between the insider's lob-5 duty to the other party to the
transaction to disclose 'material' facts and the common law duty he will often have
to the company not to make premature disclosure." 6 L. Loss, supra note 27, at 3588.
114. Id. at 3590.
115. See NYSE MANUAL, supra note 11, at A-18 to -20. The Manual provides:
A corporation whose stock is listed on the New York Stock Exchange is
expected to release quickly to the public any news or information which might
reasonably be expected to materially affect the market for securities. This is one
of the most important and fundamental purposes of the listing agreement which
each corporation enters into with the Exchange ....
A corporation should also act promptly to dispel unfounded rumors which
result in unusual market activity or price variations.
Id. at A-18.
116. But see Financial Indus. Fund v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973). In this lOb-5 action for damages,
brought by a mutual fund against McDonnell Douglas Corporation (Douglas) and
the underwriter of Douglas, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recognized in dicta that a cor-
poration may be held liable for nondisclosure in the absence of trading. Id. at 521.
Although the plaintiff in this case did not successfully meet its burden of proof, the
court articulated what a plaintiff must prove in order to prevail in a nondisclosure case:
To prevail the plaintiff in this silence case had the burden of proof to establish
that it exercised due care in making its stock purchase, that the defendant failed
to issue the special earnings statement when sufficient information was available
for an accurate release (or could have been collected by the exercise of due dili-
gence), and to show there existed a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff
to so disclose as to do otherwise would be a violation of Rule lOb-5, and upon
inaction under such showing plaintiff relied to its detriment. The defendant as
a separate defense could show either good faith or the exercise of good business
judgment in its acts or inaction.
Id. at 521.
117. For a discussion of the lOb-5 disclosure requirements, see notes 109-12 and
accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the NYSE's disclosure requirements for
listed companies, see note 113 and accompanying text supra.
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or which looks toward, the redemption of a listed security .... 1118 In
certain cases the NYSE will allow a company to refrain from disclosing
material information.'1 9 However, companies permitted to pursue a course
of nondisclosure must carefully confine their secret negotiations to a small
group of top management officials.
120
The question presented by the coexistence of these two sets of dis-
closure requirements is whether a cause of action may lie for a violation of
the listing agreement when this infraction is not likewise violative of rule
lOb-5.121 In Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 12 2 a recent case imputing civil
liability to an issuer for violating his listing agreement with the NYSE,
the Second Circuit granted plaintiffs standing to assert their claim despite
the fact that they did not also assert an implied lOb-5 action for damages.1
23
If future courts follow the precedent established by Van Gemert, implied
rights of action for breaches of the NYSE listing agreement could con-
ceivably become vehicles for the expression of those "vexatious" claims
,ondemned by the Supreme Court in a recent decision.1 24 Nevertheless,
judicial recognition of this form of implied action would undoubtedly pro-
vide assurance that plaintiffs with colorable claims would not be denied
access to federal courts merely because they were not purchasers or sellers
within the meaning of rule lOb-5.125 It is submitted that the most equitable
manner of resolving this complex issue would be for courts to apply a
balancing test in each individual case, weighing the policy of investor pro-
tection against the necessity of maintaining an efficient securities market
wherein listed companies and their representatives could protect their
legitimate business interests with a minimal amount of unnecessary inter-
ference.
118. NYSE MANUAL, supra note 11, at A-170. This is the portion of the listing
agreement found actionable in Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373, 1376 (2d Cir.
1975). See notes 81-89 and accompanying text supra.
119. See NYSE MANUAL, supra note 11, at A-19.
120. Id. In the event that other people become aware of the confidential informa-
tion, the corporation must make an immediate public announcement. Id.
121. It is fairly certain that adherence to the NYSE disclosure guidelines will not
protect a corporation from a successful lOb-5 suit. See A. JACOBS, supra note 111,
at § 93. Professor Loss has postulated that the courts will probably treat the NYSE
disclosure requirements as reinforcements to the lob-5 obligations rather than as an
upper limit on the legal responsibilities of insiders. See 6 L. Loss, supra note 27,
at 3592.
122. 520 F.2d 1373 (2d Cir. 1975) ; see notes 83-91 and accompanying text supra.
123. 520 F.2d at 1380.
124. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), the
Court noted:
We believe that the concern expressed for the danger of vexatious litigation
which could result from a widely expanded class of plaintiffs under Rule lob-5
is founded in something more substantial than the common complaint of the many
defendants who would prefer avoiding lawsuits entirely to either settling them
or trying them.
Id. at 740.
125. Even the Blue Chip Stamps Court recognized that some plaintiffs with actual
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VI. CONCLUSION
In an effort to effectuate the underlying purpose of the Exchange Act
- protection of investors - the judiciary has often permitted private rights
of action to lie for violations of the rules or listing agreements of the
national stock exchanges. Despite the fear of some that the implication of
civil liability would have a disruptive effect on the securities market, it
has proven to be a resourceful method of implementing the congressional
design. At present, most courts hold actionable only those rules which are
specific, designed for the public benefit, and a substitute for rules of the
Commission. As long as these judicially created safeguards remain in force,
it is unlikely that the process of implication will subject the exchanges to
unlimited liability. Rather, it will surely foster achievement of the goal
of an honest and efficient system of securities regulation, one in which
the investing public can justifiably have confidence.
Susan M. Denbo
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